Locating Inevitable Disclosure\u27s Place in Trade Secret Analysis by Saulino, Jennifer L.
Michigan Law Review 
Volume 100 Issue 5 
2002 
Locating Inevitable Disclosure's Place in Trade Secret Analysis 
Jennifer L. Saulino 
University of Michigan Law School 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr 
 Part of the Courts Commons, Intellectual Property Law Commons, and the Torts Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Jennifer L. Saulino, Locating Inevitable Disclosure's Place in Trade Secret Analysis, 100 MICH. L. REV. 1184 
(2002). 
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol100/iss5/7 
 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of Michigan Law 
School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review by an authorized editor 
of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact 
mlaw.repository@umich.edu. 
NOTE 
Locating Inevitable Disclosure's Place in Trade 
Secret Analysis 
Jennifer L. Saulino 
INTRODUCTION 
For ten years, William Redmond, Jr. ,  worked for PepsiCo, the 
maker of the sports drink All-Sport.1 Redmond's status as General 
Manager gave him access to trade secrets.2 PepsiCo protected those 
trade secrets by contract, and, as is typical, PepsiCo required 
Redmond to sign a confidentiality agreement covering all "confiden­
tial information relating to the business of [PepsiCo]."3 This confiden­
tiality agreement, like most of its kind, protected the company from 
the danger that an employee who knew secret information would 
change jobs and disclose that information. 
In late 1994, Redmond accepted a position with Quaker's Gator­
ade division, a major competitor of PepsiCo's All-Sport. Redmond's 
new position held sufficient similarities to his position at PepsiCo that 
PepsiCo had reason to fear he might use the secret information he 
held. PepsiCo filed suit seeking a temporary injunction to prevent 
Redmond from assuming his duties at Quaker and to prevent him 
from disclosing trade secrets. PepsiCo's argument, which became the 
defining element of the case and caused the case to become a pivotal 
component of current trade secret law, was that Redmond would "in­
evitably disclose" PepsiCo trade secrets in his new job at Quaker.4 
1. See PepsiCo, Inc. v. Redmond, 54 F.3d 1262, 1264 (7th Cir. 1995). 
2. "A trade secret may be broadly defined as any secret process, formula, program or 
other confidential information that derives commercial value from being kept secret, where 
the owner of the information has taken reasonable steps to protect that secrecy." 1 WILLIAM 
c. HOLMES, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND ANTITRUST LAW § 2.01, at 2-1 (1999) (citing 
Uniform Trade Secrets Act § 1(4), 14 U.L.A. 437 (amended 1985). 
3. PepsiCo, 54 F.3d at 1264. 
4. See id. at 1266. Specifically, PepsiCo argued that, among other things, Redmond had 
knowledge of its "Strategic Plan," an annually revised document containing competition 
plans, as well as goals and strategies for manufacturing, production, marketing, packaging, 
and distribution for three years. PepsiCo also cited its Annual Operating Plan (" AOP") as a 
trade secret because it contained sensitive information about how PCNA (PepsiCo of North 
America) priced its products in the marketplace. The AOP included customer development 
agreements which detail how PepsiCo targeted potential customers. PepsiCo considered this 
information a trade secret because it would allow competitors to anticipate pricing moves 
1184 
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PepsiCo argued that it found itself "in the position of a coach, one of 
whose players [had] left, playbook in hand, to join the opposing team 
before the big game. "5 The Seventh Circuit agreed and enjoined 
Redmond from working for Gatorade for six months.6 
One basic principle of trade secrets law is that employees owe a 
duty to employers not to disclose information that qualifies as a trade 
secret. Ordinarily, an employer may recover damages from, or secure 
an injunction against, the misappropriation or disclosure of trade se­
crets.7 An employee's general knowledge, on the other hand, is not 
considered a trade secret.8 Inevitable disclosure lies between .these two 
extremes. As this Note defines it, and as its history supports, inevitable 
disclosure means that the employee's general knowledge and the em­
ployer's trade secrets cannot be separated so that it would be "virtu­
ally impossible"9 for the employee to do his or her new job without 
using the former employer's secrets.10 
As companies become more technologically based and employees 
more mobile, the concept of inevitable disclosure likely will apply in­
creasingly to trade secret disputes between employers and former em­
ployees. 1 1  More and more, trade secrets are not concrete formulas that 
a court could simply tell an employee not to disclose. Companies de­
pend increasingly on ideas in such areas as technology or marketing, 
as in PepsiCo. Even if a court granted an injunction against disclosure 
and underbid strategically. Redmond not only had detailed knowledge of this information, 
he had been involved in preparing PCNA's customer development agreements in California 
and with California-based national customers. PepsiCo feared that Redmond could not pos­
sibly do his job well at Quaker without using the knowledge he had of PepsiCo's strategic 
plans to chart Quaker strategy. 
5. Id. at 1270. 
6. Id. at 1272. 
7. See Uniform Trade Secrets Act § 2, § 3, 14 U.L.A. 437 (amended 1985). 
8. See infra notes 33-34 and accompanying text. 
9. Emery Indus., Inc. v. Cottier, No. C-1-78-474, 1978 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15953 at *17 
(S.D. Ohio Aug. 18, 1978). 
10. The defining element of inevitable disclosure is that, as the name would suggest, dis­
closure will happen even in the best of good faith. As will be demonstrated, there are some 
cases that seem to equate inevitable disclosure with threatened misappropriation and thus 
require some demonstration of intent to disclose. See infra note 37 and accompanying text. 
11. See, e.g., Matthew K. Miller, Note, Inevitable Disclosure Where No Non-Competition 
Agreement Exists: Additional Guidance Needed, 6 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 9 (2000). 
As an increasing number of companies vie for the riches of the high-tech world, the value of 
employees with technical knowledge and the knowledge of markets and customers continues 
to rise. At the same time, however, employees are leaving their jobs with greater and greater 
frequency to work for competitors or start their own businesses. 
Id. (citing Stephen L. Sheinfeld & Jennifer M. Chow, Employees' Duties and Liabilities: 
Protecting Employer Confidences, in WRONGFUL TERMINATION CLAIMS: WHAT 
PLAINTIFFS & DEFENDANTS HAVE TO KNOW 347, 349 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice 
Course, Handbook Series No. 581, 1998)). 
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of newer trade secrets, the employee would disclose inadvertently just 
by doing his job. 
PepsiCo was not the first case to invoke an argument of inevitable 
disclosure of trade secrets.12 Yet, recognition of inevitable disclosure 
by the Seventh Circuit gave the argument a legitimacy that sparked a 
sharp increase in its use. Courts and commentators grappling with in­
creasingly difficult trade secret disclosure issues latched onto the the­
ory of inevitable disclosure as a panacea to the problem of how to 
handle complicated cases of trade secrets held in former employees' 
heads.13 
Unfortunately neither the PepsiCo court, nor any court following 
PepsiCo, has defined the doctrine of inevitable disclosure.14 Courts 
analyze trade secrets cases by a standard, uniform method. The doc­
trine of inevitable disclosure, however, emerged as judges looked for 
ways to correct inequities that did not fit into the trade secrets mold. 
The birth of the inevitable disclosure doctrine was a solution to a 
problem of equity. The PepsiCo court gave legitimacy and importance 
to the doctrine as a part of trade secrets law but failed to give courts a 
12. See, e.g., Sybron Corp. v. Wetzel, 385 N.E.2d 1055 (N.Y. 1978). 
13. See, e.g., Lumex. Inc. v. Highsmith, 919 F.D. Supp. 624, 633 (E.D.N.Y. 1996); Merck 
& Co. v. Lyon, 941 F. Supp. 1443, 1457 (M.D.N.C. 1996) (relying on PepsiCo); Cardinal 
Freight Carriers, Inc. v. J.B. Hunt Transp. Servs., Inc., 987 S.W.2d 642, 644 (Ark. 1999); 
Novell v. Timpanogos Research Group Inc., 1998 WL 177721, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d 1197, (Utah 
Jan. 30, 1998); Hanna Bui-Eve, To Hire or Not to Hire: What Silicon Valley Companies 
Should Know About Hiring Competitors' Employees, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 981, 998 (1997); Pe­
ter Huang, Preventing Post-PepsiCo Disaster: A Proposal for Refining the Inevitable Disclo­
sure Doctrine, 15 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH L.J. 379, 405 (1999); "Inevitable" 
Misappropriation After PepsiCo, Inc. v. Redmond, 537 PLI/Pat 1999, 201 (1998); Jay L. Koh, 
From Hoops to Hard Drives: An Accession Law Approach to the Inevitable Misappropria­
tion of Trade Secrets, 48 AM. U. L. REV. 271, 279 (1998) ("Following PepsiCo, an even 
greater number of courts have discussed, adopted, and applied the inevitable misappropria­
tion doctrine."); Lawrence I. Weinstein, Revisiting the Inevitability Doctrine: When Can a 
Former Employee Who Never Signed a Non-Compete Agreement Nor Threatened to Use or 
Disclose Trade Secrets Be Prohibited from Working for a Competitor, 21 AM. J. TRIAL 
ADVOC. 211, 228 (1997). 
14. Over the past several years, three authors have proposed methods of imposing order 
on the confused "doctrine" of inevitable disclosure, noting courts' inconsistencies. None of 
them, however, has proposed to define the doctrine within the framework of the traditional 
trade secrets analysis. 
Over the last thirty years, a growing number of federal and state courts have wrestled with 
employers' concerns regarding the disclosure of trade secrets in an attempt to develop a co­
herent approach to the doctrine of inevitable misappropriation. Unfortunately, the result has 
been an inconsistent, unpredictable and undesirable patchwork of legal standards that ap­
pears both inequitable and inefficient. 
Koh, supra note 13, at 273-74; see also Susan Street Whaley, Comment, The Inevitable Dis­
aster of Inevitable Disclosure, 67 U. CIN. L. REV. 809, 811 (1999) (referring to the "unde­
fined and misapplied inevitable disclosure doctrine"); Suellen Lowry, Note, Inevitable Dis­
closure Trade Secret Disputes: Dissolutions of Concurrent Property Interests, 40 STAN. L. 
REV. 519, 521 (1998) ("A brief sampling of typical inevitable disclosure decisions demon­
strates that they are often not based on in-depth doctrinal analysis."). 
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defined standard from which to build.15 If trade secrets law is to con­
tinue to maintain its relative uniformity across the states, inevitable 
disclosure needs formal definition as a doctrine.16 
This Note argues that inevitable disclosure should become a stan­
dard part of trade secrets analysis. Part I argues that courts should use 
inevitable disclosure to fill the gap in standard trade secrets analysis 
between the highly protected status of trade secret and the unpro­
tected status of employee general knowledge. Part I concludes with a 
blueprint for inevitable disclosure analysis that conforms with trade 
secrets law in general. Part II argues that the definition outlined in 
Part I is consonant with the historical development of inevitable dis­
closure and trade secrets law. Part II demonstrates that the inevitable 
disclosure doctrine developed as equity filled in where trade secrets 
law created a gap. Part II then illustrates that the PepsiCo Court's 
failure to provide a doctrinal framework for inevitable disclosure cases 
has generated inconsistent judicial applications, demonstrating the 
need for a uniform standard. This Note concludes that courts should 
consider inevitable disclosure in a uniform fashion as a part of stan­
dard trade secret analysis. 
I. INEVITABLE DISCLOSURE'S PLACE IN THE STANDARD TRADE 
SECRET ANALYSIS 
This Part proposes a definition of the right held by employers that 
provides clear guidelines for the courts to apply. Furthermore, this 
definition grants courts ample discretion to fashion remedies appro­
priate to the facts of the particular case.17 Section I.A outlines the 
analysis of a typical trade secret case and identifies the gap to be filled 
by inevitable disclosure. Section I.B argues that inevitable disclosure 
15. While some readers might question why a Seventh Circuit decision on a law that is 
typically state-derived should matter to other courts, especially state courts outside the cir­
cuit, PepsiCo has been extensively cited by courts across the country. See infra note 106. 
Trade secrets law is largely uniform so the extent of the decision's impact is not surprising. 
16. The historically low profile of trade secrets may explain why the natural combina­
tion that would make inevitable disclosure a standard part of a trade secret analysis has not 
yet been achieved. 
In the field of intellectual property the trade secret is in a very real sense the "unsung hero." 
One of the reasons for this is the fact that trade secret protection does not require bureauc­
racies or government agencies. As a direct result, with the exception of a relatively small 
number of attorneys who have chosen to become specialists in the field, there is not 'trade 
secret bar' to compare to the cadre of dedicated professionals that is involved in the granting 
and enforcing of patents, copyrights, and trademarks. 
1 TERRENCE F. MACLAREN, WORLDWIDE TRADE SECRETS LAW xxxv (1998). 
17. While previous authors who addressed the inevitable disclosure confusion may not 
have provided courts with much guidance on how to formulate their decisions, they did 
rightly recognize the need for courts to remain sensitive to the unique consequences of re­
stricting the employment options of an individual because of the rights of a former em­
ployer. See infra note 60. 
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should fill this gap and proposes a blueprint for incorporating inevita­
ble disclosure into the trade secret analysis. The blueprint de-couples 
the determination that disclosure is inevitable from the question of 
remedy while still recognizing the necessity of an intensive case­
specific analysis. This Part ultimately concludes that courts must for­
mally recognize and define the inevitable disclosure doctrine in a uni­
form fashion to best protect the rights of employers and employees. 
A. A Typical Trade Secrets Case - Identifying the Gap 
The typical trade secrets analysis involves identifying a trade se­
cret, identifying its actual or threatened disclosure, and fashioning a 
remedy. The remedies for actual and threatened misappropriation18 
differ. With actual disclosure, courts typically award damages. For 
threatened misappropriation, courts should, ideally, grant an injunc­
tion against disclosure or use. This procedure best serves the owner's 
purposes because the secret remains a secret. The remedy phase is the 
key to identifying the gap: a secret subject to inevitable disclosure, by 
definition, cannot be enjoined. 
The first step in the general trade secret analysis is a determination 
that a trade secret exists. A trade secret is information that is valuable, 
secret, and the subject of reasonable efforts by the employer to keep it 
secret: "A trade secret may be broadly defined as any secret process, 
formula, program or other confidential information that derives com­
mercial value from being kept secret, where the owner of the informa­
tion has taken reasonable steps to protect that secrecy."19 Unless a 
trade secret exists, none of the remaining analysis matters. The defini­
tion is broad so that a limitless amount of information could become a 
"trade secret. "20 The moment information is publicly disclosed, how­
ever, it loses its status as a trade secret, no matter how the disclosure 
18. Misappropriation and disclosure are, for all intents and purposes under trade secrets 
law, synonymous. The theory is that a trade secret, once disclosed, is no longer a trade secret 
and that is how damage is done. Misappropriation is used as simply another word for disclo­
sure - indicating that one only "misappropriates" (steals) a trade secret by wrongfully dis­
closing and using it. "Threatened misappropriation" is unlawful under common law of trade 
secrets and most state laws. See Uniform Trade Secrets Act § 2, 14 U.L.A. 437 (amended 
1985) ("Actual or threatened misappropriation may be enjoined."). The important point 
here is that inevitable disclosure is the recognition of a category falling somewhere between 
a blatant violation already recognized and prohibited by law and the disclosure of "general 
employee knowledge" not considered a trade secret. 
Id. 
19. HOLMES, supra note 2, at § 2.01. 
20. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 39 cmt. d (1995): 
It is not possible to state the precise criteria for determining the existence of a trade secret. 
The status of information claimed as a trade secret must be ascertained through a compara­
tive evaluation of all the relevant factors, including the value, secrecy, and definition of the 
information and the nature of the defendant's misconduct. 
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occurs.21 Information disclosed confidentially, however, remains secret 
for the purposes of trade secrets definition.22 Causes of action for trade 
secrets protection can be contractually based or premised in criminal 
or tort theory.23 
The basic elements of that cause of action are described in § 757 of 
the Restatement of Torts: 
One who discloses or uses another's trade secret, without a privilege to 
do so, is liable to the other if: 
(a) he discovered the secret by improper means, or 
(b) his disclosure or use constitutes a breach of confidence reposed in 
him by the other in disclosing the secret to him, or 
( c) he learned the secret from a third person with notice of the facts that 
it was a secret and that the third person's disclosure of it was otherwise a 
breach of his duty to the other. 24 
Essentially, a person is liable for disclosing a trade secret if he 
"stole" the secret or was entrusted with it through the course of em­
ployment and knew it was a secret. Thus, the former employee can be 
liable for disclosing a secret to a new employer and the new employer 
can be liable for "stealing" the secret.25 This formulation of liability 
21. HOLMES, supra note 2, at § 2.04, 2-17 ("Public disclosure of a trade secret destroys 
the information's status as a protected trade secret - a result which follows whether the dis­
closure was intentional, accidental, or even the result of someone else's wrongdoing."). 
Id. 
22. Id. § 2.03 at 2-13 to 2-14: 
The courts recognize the necessity of certain confidential disclosures if the trade secret 
owner is to effectively carry out its trade or business . . .  the courts hold that if the nature of 
the disclosure gives rise to an express or implied obligation of confidentiality, the person re­
ceiving the information will be held to that obligation, and the mere fact of disclosure will 
not itself forfeit trade secret status . . . .  
23. Id. § 2.04 at 2-15. While many states have criminal sanctions for certain types of 
trade secrets misappropriation, even the federal government criminalized knowing and in­
tentional misappropriation by federal law. See Economic Espionage Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 
104-294 (codified in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.). This Note focuses on those causes of 
action arising out of the common law and statutory actions for tortious misappropriation of 
trade secrets. Recall that "misappropriation" and "disclosure" are synonymous in the trade 
secrets world. See supra note 18. 
24. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 (1939). 
25. See Uniform Trade Secrets Act § 101, 14 U.L.A. 438 (amended 1985). 
"Misappropriation" means: 
(i) acquisition of a trade secret of another by a person who knows or has reason to know that 
the trade secret was acquired by improper means; or 
(ii) disclosure or use of a trade secret of another without express or implied consent by a 
person who 
(A} used improper means to acquire knowledge of the trade secret; or 
(B) at the time of disclosure or use, knew or had reason to know that his knowledge of 
the trade secret was 
(I) derived from or through a person who had utilized improper means to acquire it; 
(II} acquired under circumstances giving rise to a duty to maintain its secrecy or limit 
its use; or 
(111) derived from or through a person who owed a duty to the person seeking relief to 
maintain its secrecy or limit its use; or 
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means that often trade secrets cases are brought jointly against the 
former employee and the employee's new employer. 
The "secret" part of the trade secret is crucial. If the owner of a 
trade secret does not demonstrate efforts to keep it secret, a trade se­
cret does not exist. Both the common law formulation and the Uni­
form Trade Secrets Act ("UTSA") contain a requirement of "reason­
able measures" to keep the information secret.26 The case law on this 
point varies as to how much effort is required to establish a "reason­
able measure[]" and what combination of factors will suffice.27 For in­
stance, courts have imposed requirements such as confidentiality 
agreements,28 restricted access,29 or passwords for computer material.30 
Once the existence of a trade secret is established, misappropria­
tion under the UTSA and common law approaches takes two basic 
forms: actual or threatened misappropriation. Both actual and threat­
ened misappropriation are considered unlawful. Courts engage in a 
fact-specific inquiry as to whether the former employee actually dis­
closed and/or the new employer actually used the secret or whether 
one of the two has threatened to do so. 
After a finding of trade secret misappropriation, the courts move 
on to remedy.31 Courts commonly measure damages either as a func­
tion of the plaintiff's actual economic injury, a function of the defen­
dant's wrongful gain from exploitation of the trade secret in a restitu­
tion or unjust enrichment theory, or a reasonable royalty for the 
Id. 
(C) before a material change of his [or her] position, knew or had reason to know that it 
was a trade secret and that knowledge of it had been acquired by accident or mistake. 
26. See ROGER M. MILGRIM, 1 MILGRIM ON TRADE SECRETS § 1.04 (2000) ("Essen­
tially, the courts require that a trade secret owner take reasonable measures to protect se­
crecy. Some courts might phrase the requirement more stringently to suggest that secrecy 
should be protected to the extent possible.") (citations omitted); see also 14 U.L.A. 438 
(amended 1985): 
Id. 
"Trade secret" means information, including a formula, pattern, compilation, program, de­
vice, method, technique, or process, that: 
(i) derives independent economic value, actual or potential, from not being generally known 
to, and not being readily ascertainable by proper means by, other persons who can obtain 
economic value from its disclosure or use, and is the subject of efforts that are reasonable 
under the circumstances to maintain its secrecy. 
27. See MILGRIM, supra note 26, at § 1.04. 
28. See, e.g., Tyson Metal Prods., Inc. v. McCann, 546 A.2d 119, 122 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
1988). 
29. See, e.g., Capsonic Group, Inc. v. Plas-Met Corp., 361 N.E.2d 41, 44 (Ill. App. Ct. 1 
1977). 
30. See, e.g., Schalk v. State, 767 S.W.2d 441, 443 (Tex. App. 1988). 
31. HOLMES, supra, note 2 ("Once the basic elements of a cause of action have been 
established, a wide range of relief may be requested."). 
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purchase of the right to use the secret.32 In cases of threatened misap­
propriation and sometimes in cases of actual misappropriation, courts 
fashion an injunction preventing the competitor from using or dis­
closing the secret. Because the secret, once disclosed, is no longer con­
sidered a trade secret, disclosure can mean great economic loss to the 
former employer. 
Unfortunately, sometimes information can be hard to classify. 
Concrete formulas can be identified as secret and are either disclosed 
or not. If an employee holds a formula in his head, he can be told not 
to reveal it. Other information might not be easily classified as either 
the company's secret or the employee's general knowledge. Employ­
ees' general skills, knowledge, and experience are not considered 
trade secrets.33 As the Restatement on Unfair Competition recognizes: 
Information that forms the general skill, knowledge, training, and expe­
rience of an employee cannot be claimed as a trade secret by a former 
employer even when the information is directly attributable to an in­
vestment of resources by the employer in the employee . ... Whether 
particular information is properly regarded as a trade secret of the for­
mer employer or as a part of the general skill, knowledge, training, and 
experience of the former employee depends on the facts and circum­
stances of the particular case.34 
This Restatement section addresses a problem within the competitive 
marketplace; namely, while employees gain skills from their employ­
ers, they should not be prevented from changing jobs. It shows that 
courts developed the common law theory that general employee 
knowledge could not be protected as a trade secret. This passage from 
the Restatement, though, highlights that exactly what qualifies as gen­
eral knowledge has always been considered a case specific determina­
tion. 
Courts have long wrestled with the distinction between general 
knowledge and experience and specific trade secret knowledge.35 Some 
32. Id. ("Punitive damages have also on occasion been awarded, as have been attorney's 
fees in exceptional cases . . . .  Potentially the most valuable remedy, however, will be an ac­
tion for injunctive relief."). 
33. See MILGRIM, supra, note 26, at § 5.02(3][a] (citations omitted); see also 
Hoskins Mfg. Co. v. PMC, 47 F. Supp. 2d 852 (E.D. Mich. 1999). 
34. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 42 cmt. d (1995). 
35. See, e.g., AMP, Inc. v. Fleischhacker, 823 F.2d 1 199, 1207 (7th Cir. 1987) (proclaim­
ing of the general skills and knowledge acquired in the course of employment, "Those are 
things an employee is free to take and to use in later pursuits, especially if they do not take 
the form of written records, compilations or analyses."); S. l. Handling Sys. , Inc. v. Heisley, 
581 F. Supp. 1553 (E.D. Penn. 1984): 
In this context "know-how" takes on a meaning far beyond simply assembling components. 
Rather, it is the ability, gained from trial and error, experimentation and the expenditure of 
many dollars in investment which collectively gave to S. l .  this type of know-how. This know­
how is distinguishable from an individual's general knowledge and skill. 
Id.; Trilog Ass'n., Inc. v. Famularo, 314 A.2d 287, 291-94 (Pa. 1974) (distinguishing between 
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courts have found the distinction almost impossible to make because 
the information is inseparable from the employee, and yet still a trade 
·secret. A gap in the definitional coverage of trade secrets law has de­
veloped.36 
B. A "Typical" Inevitable Disclosure Case - Filling the Gap 
If inevitable disclosure is a trade secrets doctrine, courts should 
follow the same three step process of identifying the secret, identifying 
whether it has been or will be disclosed, and fashioning a remedy. 
Traditional trade secrets law leads to solutions for most problems of 
how to protect secrets. Trade secrets law is not equipped, however, to 
deal with a secret that is inseparable from an employee - that is the 
gap that inevitable disclosure must fill. The most consistent and effec­
tive way to give structure to inevitable disclosure is to begin with a 
narrow definition of what the doctrine encompasses. This doctrinal 
framework leaves other trade secret issues in their established catego­
ries. For instance, cases of actual misappropriation should never be 
confused with inevitable disclosure. This Section proposes a narrow 
definition of inevitable disclosure and explain the necessity of keeping 
the steps separate. 
The need to define the doctrinal framework of inevitable disclo­
sure arises from its possible confusion with threatened misappropria­
tion. Cases of threatened misappropriation already are provided for 
by statute and common law. As Section A discussed, threatened mis­
appropriation is unlawful and is easily analyzed under regular trade 
secrets analysis: 1) decide whether a trade secret exists; 2) decide 
whether someone threatens disclosure; and 3) craft the appropriate 
remedy. Several courts, however, including the PepsiCo court, have 
conflated threatened misappropriation and inevitable disclosure in or­
der to grant an injunction.37 The two are distinct and courts should 
recognize the distinction.38 
knowledge of the employee and confidential information of the employer by demonstrating 
that any intelligent, talented computer programmer could have accomplished the same tasks 
without the knowledge of the plaintiffs former employer's confidential information.). 
36. See, e.g., Superior Consultant Co. v. Bailey, No. OO-CV-73439, 2000 WL 1279161 
(E.D. Mich. Aug. 22, 2000) (limiting PepsiCo to its facts and finding the facts of Bailey in­
compatible but evidencing a desire for a reconciliation of the general knowledge/trade secret 
dichotomy). 
37. See, e.g., PepsiCo, Inc. v. Redmond, 54 F.3d 1262 (7th Cir. 1995) ("[W]hen we couple 
the demonstrated inevitability that Redmond would rely on . . .  trade secrets in his new 
job . . .  with the district court's reluctance to believe that Redmond would refrain from dis­
closing these secrets [we conclude the injunction is proper]."); La Calhene, Inc. v. Spolyar, 
938 F. Supp. 523, 531 (W.D. Wis. 1996) ("It is sufficient to show the threat of misappropria­
tion . . . .  The threat of misappropriation is very real. Defendant's position with plaintiff gave 
him such intimate knowledge of plaintiff's research, product development, finances, mar­
keting strategies and pricing information that it is all but inevitable that he will utilize that 
knowledge . . . .  "); Merck & Co., Inc. v. Lyon, 941 F. Supp. 1443, 1457 (M.D.N.C. 1996) 
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Inevitable disclosure doctrine fills the gap between actual misap­
propriation and employee general knowledge by addressing non­
malicious or unintentional but nonetheless inevitable disclosure. It 
provides a remedy when an injunction against disclosure will not suf­
fice because the information is inseparable from the employee. Thus, 
the information is recognized as a trade secret and not employee gen­
eral knowledge, yet the employee is not acting in bad faith nor actually 
threatening disclosure. 
The important distinction between inevitable. disclosure·· and 
threatened misappropriation is one of remedy. Threatened misappro­
priation can be remedied by an injunction against disclosure, which 
brings with it court sanctions. Inevitable disclosure is a much more se­
rious problem, because an injunction against disclosure will not work. 
The only remedy is an injunction against the employee working in 
some defined sector of his or her field. The remedy typically will be an 
injunction against employment but with compensation. 39 
Obviously, employers prefer an injunction against employment no 
matter the type of case because a court order may not deter a threat­
ening employee.40 The implications for the affected employee, how­
ever, necessitate that the law not allow employers such a cushion. 
With inevitable disclosure, evidence of bad faith or ill-intent is not a 
("Plaintiffs seek an injunction based on threatened misappropriation under a theory of 'in­
evitable disclosure.' "); Cardinal Freight Carriers, Inc. v. J.B. Hunt Transp. Serv., Inc., 987 
S.W.2d 642, 644 (Ark. 1999): 
Based on the foregoing findings, the trial court found that Cardinal had no compunction 
about suing or disclosing information covered under Hunt's confidential agreement to gain 
an unfair advantage. We believe such evidence and findings are more than sufficient to show 
a threatened or inevitable misappropriation of Hunt's trade secrets. 
Id.; Strata Mktg., Inc. v. Murphy, 740 N.E.2d 1166, 1177 (Ill. App. Ct., Dec. 6, 2000) ("[Plain­
tiff) argues that it pied actual and threatened/inevitable disclosure in its complaint and urges 
us to adopt the inevitable disclosure doctrine."). 
38. For instance, a recent article in the Rhode Island Bar Journal on litigating covenant 
not to compete and trade secret cases said of the UTSA: "The Act provides for injunctive 
relief to enjoin both actual and threatened misappropriation. Thus, even in cases in which 
actual misappropriation has not yet occurred, courts have enjoined potential misappropria­
tion if the likelihood of 'inevitable disclosure' exists." Mark W. Freel & Matthew T. Oliverio, 
When Commercial Freedoms Collide: Trade Secrets, Covenants Not to Compete and Free 
Enterprise, 47 RI. BAR J. 9, 41 (May 1999). 
39. This Note agrees with other authors on this topic that the obvious power inequity 
between employees and employers in these situations should lead courts to explore creative 
remedies such as an injunction coupled with a salary compensation by the former employer. 
See infra note 60. 
40. Cases that do not distinguish between threat and inevitable disclosure only �onfuse 
the issue. See, e.g., Allis -Chalmers Mfg. Co. v. Cont'l Aviation Eng'g Corp., 255 F. Supp. 645, 
654 (E.D. Mich. 1966) (determining that "[a] trade secret will not be protected by the ex­
traordinary remedy of injunction on the mere suspicion or apprehension of injury. There 
must be a substantial threat of impending injury before an injunction will is.sue"). The court 
emphasized the word "threat" but decided the case on inevitable disclosure. See id. 
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part of the analysis.41 If bad faith is present - if disclosure is actually 
threatened - then threatened misappropriation has occurred and the 
court should fashion an injunction against disclosure. 
Because inevitable disclosure is not yet part of the standard analy­
sis, courts faced with a situation where a trade secret will be disclosed 
by virtue of the new employment often decide that an injunction 
should issue and then look for a reason why, grasping the term inevi­
table disclosure.42 This approach worked well in the past because 
courts could rest their justifications on equity.43 
In an inevitable disclosure case, the first and most important step 
for a court is to decouple the decision as to which type of trade secrets 
case the court has in front of it from the remedy the court might im­
pose. Courts trying to fashion a unique remedy for inevitable disclo­
sure cases have confused the issue by making the remedy part of the 
reasoning.44 The definition of inevitable disclosure and the remedy are 
somewhat intertwined because inevitable disclosure is easiest to iden­
tify when an injunction against disclosure will not be enough. In inevi­
table disclosure cases, the relief is by necessity equitable: an injunction 
against employment, maybe for a specified period of time, and per­
haps with compensation. The trial court has much room for individu­
alized tailoring because with inevitable disclosure there is no real 
"wrongdoer."45 Further, courts are rightly sensitive to the problems in­
evitable disclosure doctrine creates for the principle of employee mo­
bility. The best solution to these problems, however, is not to ignore 
standard analysis, blend it all together, and call it equity but, rather, to 
decouple the identification of inevitable disclosure from the remedy. 
Decoupling definition from remedy will bring inevitable disclosure 
in line with standard trade secrets analysis. The UTSA decouples the 
remedy from the analysis in a regular trade secrets case by defining 
"trade secrets," "misappropriation," and "improper means" in section 
one, addressing injunctions in section two46 and addressing damages in 
41. See, e.g., Bayer Corp. v. Roche Molecular Sys. Inc., 72 F. Supp. 2d 1111  (N.D. Cal. 
1999) ("The (inevitable disclosure] theory allows plaintiff employers to demonstrate threat­
ened misappropriation without evidence of an employee's intent to disclose trade secrets.") 
(interpreting PepsiCo and other cases). 
42. See, e.g., U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co. v. First State Bank & Trust Co., 941 F. Supp. 101 
(E.D. Mo. 1996) (working backward from the prospect of an injunction, saying that it does 
not believe that the future risk of disclosure is "of a degree that would warrant injunction"). 
43. See infra Section H.B. 
44. See infra Section H.B. 
45. See FMC Corp. v. Varco Int'!, 677 F.2d 500, 504 (5th Cir. 1982) (determining that the 
disclosure of trade secrets would be at least likely if not "inevitable," then balancing the 
hardships to determine the remedy). 
46. See Uniform Trade Secrets Act § 2, 14 U.L.A. 437 (amended 1985): 
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section three.47 
In an inevitable disclosure case, courts first determine whether a 
trade secret exists or whether the information is general employee 
knowledge. At this point, the issue of inevitable disclosure emerges. If 
the information is a trade secret (and not general knowledge) but sus­
ceptible to inevitable disclosure (and not a trade secret whose disclo­
sure is threatened), then the types of equitable remedies preventing 
employment are available. Because the remedy involved in inevitable 
disclosure cases is injurious to employee mobility, courts should be es­
pecially careful to handle these cases in the proper order. 
Once the decoupling is accomplished, the first step in the analysis 
is to identify the alleged trade secrets and to determine whether they 
properly hold trade secret status.48 What information qualifies as a 
trade secret is determined by the definitional lines used by the state -
based on the Restatement or the UTSA. But all trade secret statutes 
ask whether the employer used "reasonable measures" to keep the in­
formation secret.49 At various times, courts have proposed lists of rea­
sonable measures such as keeping visitors out of certain areas or re­
quiring visitor passes or confidentiality agreements from vendors.50 
If a trade secret may be inevitably disclosed, evidence of reason­
able measures should include the employer's recognition of the possi­
bility of inevitable disclosure. If an employer knows an employee is 
likely to be exposed to trade secrets that inevitably will be disclosed if 
the employee changes jobs, that employer's demonstration of reason-
Id. 
Id. 
Actual or threatened misappropriation may be enjoined. Upon application to the court, an 
injunction shall be terminated when the trade secret has ceased to exist, but the injunction 
may be continued for an additional reasonable period of time in order to eliminate commer­
cial advantage that otherwise would be derived from the misappropriation. (b) In excep­
tional circumstances, an injunction may condition future use upon payment of a reasonable 
royalty for no longer than the period of time for which use could have been prohibited. Ex­
ceptional circumstances include, but are not limited to, a material and prejudicial change of 
position prior to acquiring knowledge or reason to know of misappropriation that renders a 
prohibitive injunction inequitable. (c) In appropriate circumstances, affirmative acts to pro­
tect a trade secret may be compelled by court order. 
47. Uniform Trade Secrets Act§ 3, 14 U.L.A. 437 (amended 1985): 
§ 3 Damages: (a) Except to the extent that a material and prejudicial change of position 
prior to acquiring knowledge or reason to know of misappropriation renders a monetary re­
covery inequitable, a complainant is entitled to recover damages for misappropriation. 
Damages can include both actual loss caused by misappropriation and the unjust enrichment 
caused by misappropriation that is not taken into account in computing actual loss. In lieu of 
damages measured by any other methods, the damages caused by misappropriation may be 
measured by imposition of liability for a reasonable royalty for a misappropriator's unau­
thorized disclosure or use of a trade secret . . . .  
48. See supra note 25 and accompanying text. 
49. See supra notes 26-30 and accompanying text. 
50. See id. 
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able efforts should include efforts to obtain a covenant not to compete 
or, at the very least, a confidentiality agreement.51 An employer who 
produces even an invalid covenant not to compete or confidentiality 
agreement, produces at least some evidence of an attempt to bargain 
with the employee at the outset over the protection of the secret.52 
Evidence of protection from inevitable disclosure, of course, is limited 
by the facts of the specific case. If, for instance, the employer is in a 
state where covenants not to compete are presumptively invalid, 
courts could not require evidence of that sort. Furthermore, special 
employment facts would negate an inference that the employer did 
not use reasonable means. For example, an employee may have 
worked for the company since its creation, before anyone could have 
foreseen inevitable disclosure. Nevertheless, for the employer who 
had the opportunity to bargain with the employee at the outset, 
knowing that the employee's mobility could be restricted by the 
knowledge of trade secrets, the lack of effort to engage in that bar­
gaining should affect the court's decision as to whether the employer 
used reasonable means to keep the information secret.53 
Only after the determination of trade secret status has been ac­
complished and the inevitability of disclosure has been proven, should 
the court move to the remedy phase. While the nature of the doctrine 
of inevitable disclosure requires injunctive relief, judges should tailor 
the injunction to the facts of the case.54 For instance, an invalid cove­
nant not to compete may mean that the employee already has bar­
gained for compensation for the inconvenience caused by the inability 
to work for a competitor for a set amount of time. Such information 
can help a judge to fashion the remedy. The possibility of inevitable 
disclosure might also provide support for upholding a covenant not to 
compete. But the two should be kept separate and distinct even when 
both are offered as theories in the same case.55 In the absence of evi-
51. See, e.g., FMC Corp., 677 F.2d at 505 -06 (recognizing the possibility of inevitable 
disclosure and then proceeding to analyze the efforts of the employer to keep the informa­
tion secret, and concluding that the requirement of all employees with access to the confi­
dential material to sign a confidentiality agreement helped to prove "reasonable measures"). 
52. See e.g., Baxter Int'l Inc. v. Morris, 976 F.2d 1189, 1 197 (8th Cir. 1992). 
53. See Merck & Co. v. Lyon, 941 F. Supp. 1443, 1461 (determining that the failure to 
seek a noncompetition agreement from the employee indicated that the type of confidential 
information the employee possessed was of limited value). 
54. See Emery Indus., Inc. v. Cottier, No. C-1-78 -474, 1978 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15953, *17-
22 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 18, 1978) (holding injunction appropriate but awarding damages to em­
ployee paid by old employer for the duration of the injunction). Although Emery was a pre­
PepsiCo case, that history is directly relevant to choices now. Precisely because this doctrine 
developed out of equity, see infra Section 11.B, courts should keep equitable principles in 
mind while using the doctrine. 
55. See, e.g., APAC Teleservices, Inc. v. McRae, 985 F. Supp. 852, 863-65 (N.D. Iowa 
1997) (using the covenant not to compete to inform the determination of trade secrets: 
"APAC's requirement that all new employees sign the nondisclosure agreement during their 
orientation session . . .  constitute[s] a 'reasonable effort under the circumstances' to protect 
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dence of an attempt to bargain for a covenant, a remedy that makes an 
employee effectively unemployable should be applied with care and 
avoided if possible.56 Courts should consider the possibility of man­
dating payment by the former employer to the employee of a suitable 
salary to compensate for the loss of employability.57 
The analysis of an inevitable disclosure case is thus fairly simple. 
The case proceeds along the same line as any trade secret case with 
room for the judge to tailor the remedy to the situation.58 Moreover, 
this analysis ensures that the identification of inevitable disclosure re­
mains separate and distinct from the judge's desire to find a remedy 
for a difficult employment situation. Such an analysis will allow the 
doctrine room to grow into itself, allowing for creativity in remedies. 
The inevitable disclosure doctrine in its current confusing state is 
often criticized as a means of bulldozing courts into allowing compa­
nies to create covenants not to compete after employment has ended.59 
That result is unfair to unsuspecting employees who suddenly find 
themselves enjoined from seeking alternative employment. Standard­
izing inevitable disclosure as part of the trade secret analysis alleviates 
those fears. With the blueprint laid out herein, courts may not move 
backward from deciding that a remedy is appropriate and then call the 
case "inevitable disclosure." They will be forced to carefully analyze 
the existence of a trade secret first. That analysis must include a 
showing of efforts by the employer to keep the information secret. If 
the court finds that the employer was aware of the inevitability prob­
lem, the court must also find that the employer tried to protect against 
such an eventuality before it crafts a remedy that limits the unsus­
pecting employee's mobility.60 
the secrecy of these trade secrets"); Int'! Paper Co. v. Suwyn, 966 F. Supp. 246, 257-59 
(S.D.N.Y. 1997) (using a discussion of inevitable disclosure to inform the court's decision 
about an injunction following the finding of an invalid covenant not to compete). 
56. This was the concern of the Emery court even in the 1970s. See Emery, 1978 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 15953, at *17-22 
57. See id. 
58. The more recent case of Bendinger v. Marshalltown Trowell Co. ,  994 S.W.2d 468, 
474-75 (Ark. 1999), recognized this necessity while at the same time acknowledging formal 
acceptance of the doctrine: "We support the chancellor's conclusion, for a finding of inevita­
ble disclosure is determined largely by the evidence and testimony before the chancellor." 
Id. 
59. See, e.g., Del Monte Fresh Produce Co. v. Dole Food Co., Inc., 148 F. Supp. 2d 1326, 
1335-36 (S.D. Fla. 2001); Michele B. Fagin, Non-Compete by Non-Disclosure: The Doctrine 
of Inevitable Disclosure, 28 COLO. LAW. 73, 75 (1999) ("The ability to prevent competition 
does not rest solely on the terms and enforceability of written non-competes."). 
60. All three of the other authors who have extensively studied the problem and pro­
posed solutions have done so with the objective of protecting employees. See Koh, supra 
note 13, at 308 ("Thus, current court approaches to the doctrine . . .  generate significant in­
equitable and inefficient results as well as an undesirable, generally pro-employer bias that 
discounts or ignores fundamental employee interests and resources."); Lowry, supra note 14, 
at 520 (claiming one of the major premises of the note to be that "the inherent flexibility of 
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While this approach does not seem to take into account em­
ployer/employee power discrepancies, it does give both employers and 
employees parameters for structuring their contractual relationships.61 
A consistent doctrinal analysis forces employers to consider the value 
of the trade secret upon hiring - before the employees lose the ability 
to compete. Formal definition helps both sides of this debate by re­
moving the incentive to use inevitable disclosure as a wild card in liti­
gation.62 Employers gain a certainty as to their rights, and yet unsus­
pecting employees are protected - especially if courts adopt the 
principle that failure to sign a covenant not to compete or confidenti­
ality agreement suggests a lack of reasonable efforts to keep the in­
formation secret. Further, the decoupling of determination of inevita­
ble disclosure from the remedy should promote honesty and clarity in 
court opinions. A coherent doctrine will enable courts to explicitly de-
the current approach may subtly favor the interests of employers"); Whaley, supra note 14, 
at 811 ("[T]hrough the use of the undefined and misapplied inevitable disclosure doctrine, 
some courts that purport to be protecting the important value of trade secrets actually are 
restricting competition and preventing employee mobility in a way contrary to the tradi­
tional approach taken by many courts."). It seems likely that with this type of analysis the 
concerns of inequities for employees would also be alleviated because courts would have 
clear precedents as would lawyers drafting employment contracts. 
Id. 
61. See Earthweb, Inc. v. Schlack, 71 F. Supp. 2d 299, 310 (S.D.N.Y. 1999): 
While the inevitable disclosure doctrine may serve the salutary purpose of protecting a com­
pany's investment in its trade secrets, its application is fraught with hazards. Among these 
risks is the imperceptible shift in bargaining power that necessarily occurs upon the com­
mencement of an employment relationship marked by the execution of a confidentiality 
agreement. When that relationship eventually ends, the parties' confidentiality agreement 
may be wielded as a restrictive covenant, depending on how the employer views the new job 
its former employee had accepted. This can be a powerful weapon in the hands of an em­
ployer; the risk of litigation alone may have a chilling effect on the employee. Such con­
straints should be the product of open negotiation. 
62. See Miles J. Feldman, Toward a Clearer Standard of Protectable Information: Trade 
Secrets and the Employment Relationship, 9 HIGH TECH. L. J. 151, 172 (1994): 
The absence of a distinct legal rule gives both employees and their prospective employers an 
incentive to capitalize on information that is not rightfully theirs. The employer may not be 
able to assess whether the information is protectable as a trade secret. Moreover, the parties 
will be uncertain as to who will ultimately prevail in litigation. The uncertainty of prevailing 
combined with the high costs of litigation reduces the risk of loss to the employee who then 
has a greater incentive to misappropriate. A more certain rule would help to adjust the risks 
of litigation so that neither party will take advantage of an unclear rule. 
Id.; see also Koh, supra note 13, at 304: 
Id. 
If an injunction is granted, the employee is generally not compensated for her lost employ­
ment opportunities and the employer does not have to pay for the benefit of barring a com­
petitor from acquiring a skilled employee . . . .  On the other hand, if an injunction is denied, 
an employer will not be compensated for harm . . .  while the employee does not have to pay 
for the value she received from exposure to such trade secrets. 
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tail how they determined the appropriate remedies for balancing mo­
bility of employees or competitiveness of employers.63 
One district in California formally and explicitly recognized the 
doctrine of inevitable disclosure.64 That court came to its conclusion by 
going through the UTSA definition and then examining other courts' 
use of inevitable disclosure - the first of those being PepsiCo.65 This 
court's finding that the state's adoption of the UTSA naturally leads to 
the doctrine of inevitable disclosure bolsters the argument that courts 
should strive for coherent definition. A federal court applying state 
law in the same state, however, rejected the doctrine as against the 
public policy of employee mobility in Califomia.66 With the definition 
outlined in this Note, the doctrine takes on a narrow scope, forcing 
employer accountability for "reasonable measures," and protecting 
63. Koh intuitively recognizes the benefits of decoupling during his discussion of the 
merits and downfalls of a concurrent property interest approach: "Courts could determine 
inevitability of misappropriation separately from the appropriate remedy, thereby creating a 
more consistent set of precedents for the inevitability determination." Koh, supra note 14, at 
315-16. 
Recent cases suggest that courts may be moving in the direction suggested by this Note. 
These recent cases seem to be trying to give some concrete definition while recognizing the 
need for uniformity. See, e.g., Earthweb, 71 F. Supp. 2d at 299: 
[I]n cases that do not involve the actual theft of trade secrets, the court is essentially asked to 
bind the employee to an implied -in -fact restrictive covenant based on a finding of inevitable 
disclosure . . . .  Thus, in its purest form, the inevitable disclosure doctrine treads an exceed­
ingly narrow path through judicially disfavored territory. Absent evidence of actual misap­
propriation by an employee, the doctrine should be applied in only the rarest of cases. Fac­
tors to consider in weighing the appropriateness are . . . .  
Id.; Bendinger, 994 S.W.2d at 474 ("Recently, this court adopted the inevitable-disclosure 
rule . . . .  Because we have adopted the inevitable-disclosure rule, the only question to re­
solve is whether Bendinger's employment with Kraft will result in a situation where Bend­
inger will inevitably rely on Marshalltown's trade secrets."); Handy & Harman Elec. Materi­
als Corp. v. Molex Inc., No. C.A. 99-6323, 2000 WL 1727355, at *9 (R.I. Super. Oct. 16, 2000) 
(refusing to use theory of inevitable disclosure because there was no evidence of confidential 
information). But see Hoskins Mfg. Co. v. PMC, 47 F. Supp. 2d 852 (E.D. Mich. 1999) (de­
ciding the case based on inevitable disclosure while glossing over its own recognition that 
there was no evidence to suggest that information was in fact only known to the company -
once the court found no trade secret, the analysis should have ended). 
64. See Electro Optical Indus., Inc. v. White, 90 Cal. Rptr. 2d 680, 684 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1999): 
Although no California court has yet adopted it, the inevitable disclosure rule is rooted in 
common sense and calls for a fact specific inquiry. We adopt the rule here. In ruling on a re­
quest for a preliminary injunction, the trial court decides whether the disclosure of trade se­
crets is "likely to result" or "impossible" not to result from the subsequent employment. 
Id. That same court found that the trial court had not abused its discretion in concluding that 
the marketing plans at issue were not trade secrets and thus saw no basis for relief on that point. 
See id. at 686 ("Because the strategies are not trade secrets, the fact that SBIR might 
emulate them does not provide a basis for injunctive relief."). This opinion was subse­
quently withdrawn by order of the California Supreme Court. Electro Optical Indus., Inc. 
v. White, No. S085582, 2000 Cal. LEXIS 3536 (Cal. Apr. 12, 2000). 
65. See id. at 684. 
66. GlobeSpan, Inc. v. O'Neill, 151 F. Supp. 2d 1229 (C.D. Cal. 2001). 
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the employee by allowing the judge room to craft an appropriate rem­
edy. 
Other courts have explicitly asked for a formal doctrine. A Texas 
court in 1999 determined: 
We found no Texas case referring to a "doctrine of inevitable disclosure" 
but one case from this court has recognized that a former employee may 
be enjoined from using or disclosing the former employer's confidential 
or proprietary information if the employee is in a situation where use or 
disclosure is probable.67 
This statement suggests that this court was looking for formal recogni­
tion and definition and when it did not find any in Texas case-law his­
tory, it refused to use the doctrine. The judge in Texas may have based 
this decision on a broader concept of uniform trade secrets law. The 
judge may also have thought that plaintiff was advancing a fanciful 
theory. Either way, this case demonstrates the willingness on the part 
of courts recently to accept the UTSA as definitive and reject unde­
fined doctrines. The Texas court provides further support for a de­
fined doctrine following the standard trade secret analysis. 
II. WHY THE SOLUTION WORKS 
This Part argues that inevitable disclosure developed outside 
regular trade secrets law and cites this divergent development as the 
reason for the disjunction between them. Section II.A explains why 
this Note assumes as a baseline that uniform trade secrets law is the 
standard to which inevitable disclosure should conform.68 Section 11.B 
67. Conley v. DSC Communications Corp., No. 05 -98-01051-CV, 1999 WL 89955, at *3 
(Tex. Ct. App. Feb. 24, 1999). This language may have been motivated by the court's realiza­
tion that the inevitable disclosure claim simply did not apply. Intent to misappropriate actu­
ally existed. 
68. The even more basic assumption upholding this Note is that inevitable disclosure 
doctrine, properly formulated, fits neatly into the standard trade secret analysis. Other 
authors who have seriously addressed the issue of what to do with the nebulous doctrine of 
inevitable disclosure have attempted to categorize it as a property theory. This Note rejects 
that categorization and recognizes that the solution must include a standard trade secret 
analysis because trade secrets law is not a subset 'of property law. 
Justice Holmes long ago acknowledged the problem with using a property analysis to 
solve trade secret problems and recognized the analysis of trade secrets as distinct: 
Whether the plaintiffs have any valuable secret or not the defendant knows the facts, what­
ever they are, through a special confidence that he accepted. The property may be denied, 
but the confidence cannot be. Therefore the starting point for the present matter is not 
property or due process of law, but that the defendant stood in confidential relations with 
the plaintiffs . . . .  
E.I. Du Pont De Nemours Powder Co. v. Masland, 244 U.S. 100, 102 (1917). Another dis­
tinctive aspect of trade secrets law is that a cause of action exists for "threatened misappro­
priation" because disclosure kills the trade secret. This cause of action, specifically provided 
for in the UTSA, allows for relief, for example, if an employee has made clear his disgrun­
tlement and intent to harm the company by selling its secrets. See Uniform Trade Secrets 
Act § 2, 14 U.L.A. 437 (amended 1985). Recall also that employee general knowledge, while 
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argues that inevitable disclosure developed as a justification for equity 
in certain employment situations, outside the sphere of trade secrets. 
Section 11.C argues that PepsiCo visibly combined these two areas of 
law, giving the impression that inevitable disclosure was a doctrine 
arising out of trade secrets law, but never accounting for the inconsis­
tencies in analysis. Section 11.C is bolstered by a demonstration of the 
confusion exhibited by lower courts attempting to apply the PepsiCo 
inevitable disclosure analysis. Part II ultimately concludes that the 
standardization of definition and analysis proposed in Part I that 
would fit inevitable disclosure into trade secret law is supported by the 
historical development of both areas of law. 
A. The Uniformity of Trade Secrets Law 
Trade secrets are governed by state law.69 Normally that fact might 
mean the analysis is state- or region-specific, but most states have ad­
hered to the definitions of trade secrets found in the Restatement of 
obtained from the employer, is not considered a trade secret. As demonstrated, this aspect 
ultimately creates the gap inevitable disclosure must fill. 
The proposals of other authors are each unique and creative but lack coherence with the 
rest of trade secret law. Lowry proposes a concurrent property interest solution - analogous 
to the situation of the dissolution of community property marriages where partition of ten­
ancies in common is done "in kind" when possible and by judicial sale otherwise. See Lowry, 
supra note 14, at 540-41. She concludes that a concurrent property interest approach is the 
best method by which to promote fairness to employees while still protecting employers. Un­
fortunately, she attempts to impose a foreign structure onto a distinct area of law and fails to 
provide a framework for judges faced with more difficult facts. Id. at 544 ("The concurrent 
property doctrine is not a panacea for all uncertainties and inequities in trade secret lawsuits 
where disputed information has become inextricably tied to occupational mobility."). Jay 
Koh takes a different approach. See Koh, supra note 13, at 286 n.87 ("[T]his Article focuses 
on inconsistencies in the methodology that courts use to determine inevitability of misap­
propriation . . .  and the remedies that courts apply . . . .  [T]his Article rejects the concurrent 
property rights regime that Lowry suggests . . .  and instead suggests that the law of accession 
provides a better property model . . . .  "). Koh's solution is based on an ancient property law 
theory of accession that developed to deal with physical property that was altered or im­
proved by another. Id. at 321: 
[I]n short, accession vests title and control of a combined piece of property in the owner of 
its principal parts or in its primary transformer. Accession then directs the title holder to 
reimburse the owner of the secondary parts of a combined piece of property or its secondary 
transformer for her lesser contribution. 
Id. But Koh's solution is subject to the same criticisms that he lays on Lowry - it provides 
no justification or guidance to courts when faced with innocent employees and employers, 
one of whom will be harmed by any remedy. Koh, supra note 13, at 316 (criticizing the rec­
ognition of employee ownership interests for "jeopardizing the existing and important con­
ceptions of unified ownership of trade secrets"), 317 (arguing that "[Lowry's] system pro­
vides no justification for, or guidance to, the proportion of ownership that should be 
allocated to each . . . .  "). 
69. See K-2 Ski Co. v. Head Ski Co., 506 F.2d 471, 473 (9th Cir. 1974). Nevertheless, as 
Holmes recognizes, trade secrets actions often end up in federal courts due to diversity juris­
diction or as a pendent state claim attached to a claim under federal law, such as patent or 
trademark. See HOLMES, supra note 2, § 2.01, at 2-3 n.3 (2001). 
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Torts.70 The Restatement of Torts dropped trade secrets in 1979 ·but 
trade secrets are now addressed in the Restatement of Unfair Compe­
tition.71 Furthermore, forty-two states and the District of 
Columbia have adopted the UTSA.72 The definitions of misappropria­
tion and trade secrets found in the uniform act are derived from com­
mon law history and comport with the general usage of most states.73 
In W.C. Holmes' treatise on intellectual property law, he recognizes 
that while trade secrets are governed by state law, they are examined 
through uniform, overarching principles.74 Milgrim too discusses the 
uniformity of state decisions and the reasons why: 
While, by and large, decisions under the various UTSA will be deter­
mined by state courts in accordance with their interpretation of the form 
of the UTSA adopted by that particular state, there are two forces out­
side the state's own decisional mechanism that must be taken into ac­
count. First, of course, is the provisions of § 8 of the UTSA, which en­
courage uniformity of results among the various states enacting the 
70. PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT, PATENT, TRADEMARK AND RELATED STATE 
DOCTRINES, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LA w OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 122 (Rev. 
3d ed. 1993). 
71. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 39 cmt. a (1995): 
A trade secret is any information that can be used in the operation of a business or other en­
terprise and that is sufficiently valuable and secret to afford an actual or potential economic 
advantage over others . . . .  Liability for the appropriation of a trade secret thus rests on a 
breach of confidence or other wrongful conduct in acquiring, using, or disclosing secret in­
formation. 
Id.; see also GOLDSTEIN, supra note 70; MILGRIM, supra note 26, § 1.01(1) at 1-19 to 1-20: 
Id. 
Through conscious decision, the Reporters of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, omit­
ted numerous sections of the original RESTATEMENT on the grounds that the subject matter 
covered falls outside traditional tort law, and are embraced within the law of Unfair Compe­
tition and Trade Regulations: "The rules relating to liability for harm caused by unfair trade 
practices developed doctrinally from established principles in the law of Torts, and for this 
reason the decision was made that it was appropriate to include these legal areas in the 
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS, despite the fact that the fields of Unfair Competition and Trade 
Regulation were rapidly developing into independent bodies of law with diminishing reli­
ance upon the traditional principle of Tort law. In the more than 40 years since that decision 
was initially made, the influence of Tort law has continued to decrease, so that it is now 
largely of historical interest . . . .  
72. See Uniform Trade Secrets Act, reprinted in 14 UNIFORM LAWS ANNOTATED: 
CIVIL PROCEDURAL AND REMEDIAL LAWS 438 (Master ed. 1990 & supp. 1997). 
73. See id. 
74. HOLMES, supra note 2, § 2.02 at 2 -9 (2000) (commenting on the differences between 
the Restatement and UTSA approaches to trade secrets definitions and recognizing that the 
"precise manner in which the definition [of trade secrets] has been applied" has varied from 
court to court even within one state that has adopted the UTSA). Holmes also recognizes 
that many courts use some variation of the six factors found in the Restatement of Torts in 
order to evaluate trade secret cases, and concludes, after citing illustrative cases, that, "the 
courts have repeatedly emphasized two closely related factors as paramount: the item must 
be 'secret' and must not be 'public knowledge or of a general knowledge in the trade or 
business' (Id. at § 2-02, at 2-10, citing Kewanee Oil Corp. v. Bicron Corp. , 416 U.S. 470, 475 
(1974)). 
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UTSA. Second, are the general legal and/or equitable principles that 
may be deemed to be of overriding constitutional effect.75 
As Milgrim recognizes here, the UTSA itself encourages uniform 
principles. A less abstract reason for uniformity is that, in today's na­
tional economy, workers frequently change jobs and move across state 
lines. It is in the best interests of corporations nationwide for states to 
decide inevitable disclosure cases uniformly. 
The United States Supreme Court recognized the need for cogent 
trade secret law and analysis in Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp.16 The 
court in that case determined that federal patent law does not preempt 
protection under state trade secret law.77 More importantly for this 
analysis, however, the Supreme Court recognized the basic principles 
behind trade secret law: "[t]he maintenance of standards of commer­
cial ethics and the encouragement of invention."78 The Court in 
Kewanee was interpreting Ohio law, but spoke in general terms about 
"trade secret law," thereby recognizing and acknowledging that while 
trade secret law is state law and specifics may differ, it is uniform in 
principle.79 Speaking generally, the Court gave force to the argument 
that trade secrets not only follow a basic line of analysis across the 
country but also that they have a unique and distinct line of analysis as 
their own area of law.80 
B. The Early Development of Inevitable Disclosure 
While trade secrets developed into a distinct area of law, inevitable 
disclosure did not originate as a piece of the trade secret analysis. 
Early cases of inevitable disclosure sometimes employed various ele­
ments of trade secrets analysis, but determined the case by taking an 
75. MILGRIM, supra note 26, § 1.01(3) at 1 -44. 
76. 416 U.S. 470 (1974). 
77. See id. The Court reaffirmed this holding in Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft 
Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 157 (1989) (reaffirming the decision that state trade secret Jaws 
were not preempted by patent Jaws and citing aspects of trade secret Jaw such as the fact that 
it provides far weaker protection than patent Jaw because the product is not protected from 
copy or reverse engineering, but only misappropriation). 
Id. 
78. Kewanee, 416 U.S. at 475. 
79. Id. at 475-76. 
80. See id. at 493: 
Trade secret law and patent law have co-existed in this country for over one hundred years. 
Each has its particular role to play, and the operation of one does not take away from the 
need for the other . . . .  Trade secret law promotes the sharing of knowledge, and the effi­
cient operation of industry; it permits the individual inventor to reap the rewards of his labor 
by contracting with a company large enough to develop and exploit it. Congress, by its si­
lence over these many years, has seen the wisdom of allowing the States to enforce trade se­
cret protection. Until Congress takes affirmative action to the contrary, States should be free 
to grant protection to trade secrets. 
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equitable approach, fashioning a solution analogous to an implied or 
constructive trust.81 The constructive trust analogy is particularly apt 
because these courts sought a solution to a problem of an employee 
possessing a trade secret of his former employer, without the ability to 
sever it from his knowledge. The courts fashioned an equitable solu­
tion. They could not take the information away from the employee, so 
they found ways to compensate him for his loss of mobility protecting 
the company who actually owned the secret. In the same way, the im­
plied constructive trust has long solved problems arising when a party 
holds actual property belonging to another.82 
For example, in the 1960s a federal court in Michigan grappled 
with the distinction between an employee who threatens to disclose a 
trade secret and an employee who has made no threat but whose 
background knowledge is itself the problem.83 That court recognized 
the unique remedial problems accompanying an inevitable disclosure 
case. The Allis-Chalmers court was unwilling to make the employee 
completely unemployable. In effect, the court made the former em­
ployee the constructive trustee of the secret information by prohibit­
ing him from working on machines of similar design. While the analy­
sis outlined in this Note leads to a similar outcome, the Allis-Chalmers 
court did not engage in the standard process of evaluating an alleged 
81. DELUXE BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1515, 1517 (6th ed., 1990) (describing a re­
sulting trust and referencing the constructive trust as "[a) trust imposed by law when prop­
erty is transferred under circumstances suggesting that the transferor did not intend for the 
transferee to have the beneficial interest in the property. - Also termed implied trust . . . .  "); 
76 AM. JUR. 2d Trusts § 200 (1992) ("A constructive trust - sometimes referred to as a legal 
fiction or a fiction of equity . . .  is not a technical trust, but an implied trust."); see also Beatty 
v. Guggenheim Exploration Co., 122 N.E. 378, 380 (N.Y. 1919) ("A constructive trust is the 
formula through which the conscience of equity finds expression. When property has been 
acquired in such circumstances that the holder of the legal title may not in good conscience 
retain the beneficial interest, equity converts him into a trustee."). 
82. See 76 AM. JUR. 2d Trusts § 201 (1992): 
The constructive trust remedy is not limited to instances of actual or constructive fraud but 
may arise because of equitable principles other than fraud . . . .  Some courts have imposed a 
constructive trust where a confidential or fiduciary duty has been breached and a third party 
unjustly enriched as a result of that breach, even absent wrongdoing by the party unjustly 
enriched; thus, under the constructive trust theory, equity may collect proceeds from an inno­
cent party in order to protect the equitable rights of those who have suffered the wrong. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
83. See Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co. v. Cont'! Aviation & Eng'g Corp., 255 F. Supp. 645, 654 
(E.D. Mich. 1966) ("The virtual impossibility of [defendant) performing all of his prospec­
tive duties for [his new employer] to the best of his ability, without in effect giving it the 
benefit of [plaintiff's) confidential information, makes a simple injunction against disclosure 
and use of this information inadequate."). The court thus granted an injunction allowing the 
defendant to work at the competitor but prohibiting work on the particular type of equip­
ment about which he had internalized trade secrets of his former employer. Allis-Chalmers 
provided very little insight into the test it used to grant the injunction and left the reader 
with the feeling that the court felt an injunction to be appropriate but could not effectively 
reason under trade secrets law as to why. Inevitable disclosure gave it a solution that seemed 
equitable. See id. 
March 2002] Inevitable Disclosure 1205 
trade secret violation. The court only used the trade secret concept to 
determine that a fiduciary interest existed.84 
In 1978, a federal district court in Ohio used Allis-Chalmers as the 
sole citation to accompany the sentence: "There is considerable sup­
port for that proposition [inevitable disclosure] in the books. "85 Yet, 
the Ohio court also fashioned a solution that was equitable in nature 
- also much like a constructive trust.86 This court limited the former 
employee's employability, but required the former employer to pay 
for that limitation. Several pre-PepsiCo courts used inevitable disclo­
sure but the standards used by those courts to decide the cases var­
ied.87 For instance, some confused the determination of whether a 
trade secret existed and would be inevitably disclosed with the deter­
mination of the validity of a covenant not to compete or a confidenti­
ality agreement.88 
In 1985, one court used the words inevitable disclosure as a part of 
the steps of a standard trade secret analysis.89 While this court did not 
provide any explanation or guidance and was not followed, its decision 
suggested two things: (1) the court was looking for an established doc-
84. The court did consider what might qualify as a trade secret. See id at 653. This is an 
important first step in what should become the doctrinal analysis. 
85. Emery Indus., Inc. v. Cottier, No. C-1-78-474, 1978 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15953 at *15 
(S.D. Ohio Aug. 18, 1978). The plaintiff argued for barring the defendant from working for 
the competitor for a limited period of time because, "in the proposed position as presi­
dent . . .  it would be inevitable that he would use the very trade secret information which he 
has agreed not to use." Id. at *14-15. The Emery court determined "it is a necessary conclu­
sion based on the facts that there is an inevitable and imminent danger of disclosure of plain­
tiff's trade secrets. It will be virtually impossible for the defendant to perform his prospective 
duties for [competitor] without in effect giving [competitor] the benefit of plaintiff's confi­
dential information." Id. at *17. Except for determining that a threat of disclosure allowed 
an injunction in Ohio, the Emery court did not proceed into any deeper analysis of the ele­
ments of the "inevitable disclosure" than the discourse described above. See id. 
86. See supra notes 81-82 (discussing the constructive trust analogy). As in the case of a 
constructive trust, this court was faced with the need to fashion an equitable solution that 
would serve the needs of the owner of the trade secret held by the employee, without creat­
ing inequity for the employee who did no wrong. This court took the bold step of actually 
crafting a de jure covenant not to compete by granting the injunction but requiring the plain­
tiff to pay compensation to the former employee who could not work in his chosen field. 
Emery, 1978 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15953, at *19-20. 
87. See E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc. v. Hollister, Inc., No. 91-203, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
1395 (D.N.J. Feb. 5, 1991) (discussing the "imminent threat of disclosure" and the need for 
evidence of bad faith); Standard Brands v. Zumpe, 264 F. Supp. 254 (E.D. La. 1967) (deter­
mining inevitability of disclosure could not be presumed from employment in a managerial 
capacity); Travenol Labs., Inc. v. Turner, 228 S.E.2d 478 (N.C. Ct. App. 1976) (using the 
technical expertise of the defendant and the fact that the new employer had not sought out 
the employee prior to termination of the previous employment as a part of the determina­
tion of no inevitable disclosure). 
88. Surgider Corp. v. Eye Tech., Inc., 648 F. Supp. 661, 695 (D. Minn. 1986). 
89. Id. ("The fourth element of the trade secret cause of action requires proof that there 
is an intention on the part of the defendants to use or disclose the putative trade secrets, or 
alternatively, that under the circumstances of the case, there is a high degree of probability 
of inevitable disclosure."). 
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trine rather than just crafting an equitable solution without precedent; 
and (2) the literature and case law gave it the idea that inevitable dis­
closure was a standard element of trade secret analysis. 
In some courts, inevitable disclosure of trade secrets became a part 
of the decision to grant a preliminary injunction pending the determi­
nation of the validity of the covenant not to compete.90 Other courts 
equated inevitable disclosure with threatened misappropriation.91 
Even in 1990 at least one court still rested its decision to grant an in­
evitable disclosure preliminary injunction on an early equity case, 
without providing much in the way of explanation or analysis, except 
to imply that the facts of the early equity case were similar to the 
problem at hand.92 Despite the obvious connection between inevitable 
disclosure and trade secrets, the two developed separately. Inevitable 
disclosure became nothing more than a set of words put into quotation 
marks to solve a problem for which traditional trade secrets analysis 
could fashion no solution. The doctrine was in disarray when the Sev­
enth Circuit adopted it in PepsiCo. 
90. See Modern Controls, Inc. v. Andreadakis, 578 F.2d 1264, 1270 (8th Cir. 1978) (ac­
knowledging that trade secrets could be disclosed even in the best of good faith and granting 
preliminary injunction pending an action challenging a covenant not to compete would likely 
be valid). 
91. See Int'! Bus. Mach. Corp. v. Seagate Tech., Inc., 941 F. Supp. 98, 101 n.1 (D. Minn. 
1992) (relying on FMC v. Varco and concluding that "the Eighth Circuit has neither ac­
cepted nor rejected the 'inevitable disclosure' doctrine where the Fifth Circuit Court of Ap­
peals enjoined an employer from 'placing or maintaining [the employee] in a position that 
poses an inherent threat of disclosure"); E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc. 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
1395, at *20 (discussing the 'imminent threat of disclosure' and the need for evidence of bad 
faith in order to prove inevitable disclosure and concluding that, "[u]nlike SJ Handling, 
Squibb has not demonstrated that Leise intends to disclose, or that Hollister intends to use, 
Squibb's protected information. In addition, unlike SJ Handling, Hollister has taken meas­
ures to protect against Leise's disclosure of Squibb's confidential information"); Teradyne, 
Inc. v. Clear Communications Corp., 707 F. Supp. 353, 356 (N.D. Ill. 1989) (commenting that 
the allegation that a high degree of probability of inevitable and immediate disclosure con­
stitutes a threat to misappropriate trade secrets may have merit, recognizing that there is 
caselaw to justify an injunction against an employee working in a specialized field based on 
knowledge gained from a former employer, but deciding, "[h]ere there is no allegation that 
defendants have in fact threatened to use Teradyne's secrets or that they will inevitably do 
so. An allegation that the defendants said they would use secrets or disavowed their confi­
dentiality agreements would serve this purpose"). A very recent note on this topic also falls 
prey to the assumption that inevitable disclosure is addressed in this manner in the UTSA. 
Miller, supra note 11 ,  at 50. 
92. See Norand Corp. v. Parkin, 785 F. Supp. 1353, 1355 (N.D. Iowa 1990) ("The Emery 
court reasoned that an injunction prohibiting non-disclosure of proprietary information 
would be insufficient as the defendant in that case could not help but use his knowledge in 
his employment with the competitor company. Consequently, the court essentially created a 
non-compete agreement."). The Norand court essentially bypassed all of the intervening 
cases and cited to Emery Industries, Inc. v. Cottier, No. C-1-78-474, 1978 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
15953, at *17 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 18, 1978) to justify its decision to grant a preliminary injunc­
tion based on the likelihood of success in proving the need for a court created non-compete 
agreement. While the use of Emery was a wise move by Norand, the lack of acknowledge­
ment of any doctrine of inevitable disclosure is telling. 
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This Note argues that inevitable disclosure developed separately 
from trade secrets, and, to avoid confusion, divides the two. The early 
cases, however, demonstrate at least an awareness of the connection 
to trade secrets law and judges may have even thought that the two 
would develop in conjunction with each other. In fact, 30 years ago, 
two cases that could easily be defined as inevitable disclosure cases 
sparked the interest of trade secrets practitioners.93 At least one 
author predicted, based on these two early cases, that inevitable dis­
closure would become an important piece of trade secrets analysis.94 
That same author also thought inevitable disclosure needed definition 
93. See B.F. Goodrich Co. v. Wohlgemuth, 192 N.E.2d 99, 105 (Ohio Ct. App. 1963) (in­
volving two companies competing to design space suits for the Apollo project). The court 
recognized that because of Wohlgemuth's highly technical and specialized expertise, his was 
a unique case: 
We have no doubt that Wohlgemuth had the right to take employment in a competitive 
business, and to use his knowledge (other than trade secrets) and experience, for the benefit 
of his new employer, but a public policy demands commercial morality, and courts of equity 
are empowered to enforce it by enjoining an improper disclosure of trade secrets known to 
Wohlgemuth by virtue of his employment. Under the American doctrine of free enterprise, 
Goodrich is entitled to this protection. 
Id.; see also E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co. v. Am. Potash & Chem. Corp., 200 A.2d 428, 436 
(Del. Ch. 1964) (dealing with an employee who worked on highly specialized chemical proc­
esses and saying with relation to the speculative nature of a finding of inevitability: 
Courts are frequently called upon to draw such conclusions based on a weighing of the prob­
abilities, and while a conclusion that a certain result will probably follow may not ultimately 
be vindicated, courts are nonetheless entitled to decide or "predict" the likely consequences 
arising from a given set of facts and to grant legal remedies on that basis.). 
The American Potash court also believed its decision to be of significance for future 
trade secrets cases: 
Tlie court fully recognizes that this is a case of great social and industrial significance both on 
the question of the right to relief and, if established, the scope thereof . . . .  The "interests" 
involved are as easy to state as they are difficult to protect, particularly in the face of the 
ever-increasing complexity of present day technology. 
Am. Potash, 200 A.2d at 437. 
94. An insightful note in the Virginia Law Review described these two cases and used 
them to demonstrate that employee knowledge of trade secrets would pose increasingly 
complex problems for courts. That author recognized then that employee knowledge was 
becoming increasingly intertwined with employer trade secrets in a way that would cause 
much difficulty with the concept of trade secret misappropriation: 
If it were an easy matter to decide whether particular knowledge is a trade secret or part of a 
technical employee's general competence; if it were easy to determine in a trial whether par­
ticular knowledge has been disclosed; if it were easy to assess damages which realistically 
compensate the owner of a secret improperly revealed - then industrial piracy would pres­
ent few problems for the lawyer . . . .  An injunction against disclosure does not solve the first 
employer's problem of proving disclosure if the employee is undeterred and the injunction 
must be enforced; nor does such an injunction reach involuntary or inadvertent disclosure, 
which is a real possibility even if the employee consciously attempts not to reveal trade se­
crets to his new employer. 
Note, Inductions to Protect Trade Secrets - The Goodrich and DuPont Cases, 51 VA. L. 
REV. 917, 920 (1965). 
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as a trade secrets doctrine.95 Despite that author's prescient projec­
tions, however, the two have not been combined completely. 
C. PepsiCo's Undefined Doctrine 
In 1995, the Seventh Circuit's opinion in PepsiCo gave inevitable 
disclosure prominence as a "doctrine" within the larger structure of 
trade secrets law and purported to define it. This decision sparked a 
proliferation of opinions in state and federal courts and an abundance 
of scholarly comment. Yet, the Seventh Circuit did not delineate a 
doctrine that fit neatly into the standard trade secrets format. As a re­
sult, the many courts that have tried to follow PepsiCo have failed to 
apply the doctrine of inevitable disclosure uniformly. These courts' in­
consistencies demonstrate the lack of doctrinal framework within the 
PepsiCo decision. 
1. PepsiCo's Inevitable Disclosure Decision 
In PepsiCo, as in all inevitable disclosure cases, the court was 
asked to reconcile the employer's rights in the trade secret and the 
employee's rights in mobility. In PepsiCo, the Seventh Circuit's solu­
tion was to rest its decision in the doctrine of inevitable disclosure. As 
a result, PepsiCo sparked a modern fascination with this relatively old 
theory and granted it the title and importance of "doctrine."96 
Unfortunately, the PepsiCo court employed a mode of analysis 
that is difficult to pinpoint and seems even harder for courts to follow 
in other cases.97 The PepsiCo court began by acknowledging that de­
fendant.s did not dispute the existence of the plaintiff's trade secrets.98 
95. Id. 
96. See, e.g., Bayer Corp. v. Roche Molecular Sys., Inc., 72 F. Supp. 2d 1111,  1 118 (N.D. 
Cal. 1999) ("The PepsiCo decision has given new life to the theory of inevitable disclosure. 
Previously, courts had recognized the theory, but were reluctant to apply it because of strong 
public policies in favor of employee mobility."). 
97. Even Milgrim's treatise demonstrates confusion with the doctrine and PepsiCo's in-
terpretation. See MILGRIM, supra note 26, at § 5.02(3)(e) n.47a: 
Id. 
Inasmuch as PepsiCo pushed the inevitability doctrine into new - and arguably, inappro­
priate - areas, enjoining the employment of the former marketing director of an insignifi­
cant participant in the field by the industry leader, the district court's reliance suggests that 
PepsiCo's value will not be in what was its aberrational holding, based seemingly upon the 
trial court's satisfaction that the individual defendant had been less than forthright in testi­
mony, but rather'for the mainstream proposition that employees have the right to engage in 
competitive employment and there must be a constellation of factors before that competitive 
employment, absent a valid restrictive covenant, will be enjoined. 
98. See PepsiCo, Inc. v. Redmond, 54 F.3d 1262, 1268 (7th Cir. 1995). This is significant 
because information's status as a trade secret is sometimes a hard-fought issue in the courts. 
See MILGRIM, supra note 26, at § 1.09: 
[T)his section categorizes many of the cases in which a court has expressly or by implication 
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The court continued by conflating threatened misappropriation with 
inevitable disclosure and using as its base of support cases of threat­
ened misappropriation.99 Then the court determined that substantial 
evidence existed that Redmond possessed "extensive and intimate 
knowledge" about PCNA's strategic goals.100 Reiterating an assertion 
of an earlier case, the court recognized that, "the mere fact that a per­
son assumed a similar position at a competitor does not, without more, 
make it 'inevitable that he will use or disclose . . .  trade secret informa­
tion . . .  . '  "101 While acknowledging that this was not a "typical" trade 
secret situation, the court determined that it fell within the realm of 
protection.102 
The court finished by muddying the analysis and noting that the 
district court found that Redmond's actions in pursuing his new job 
displayed a lack of candor and "proof of [his and his new employer's] 
willingness to misuse PCNA trade secret[s] . '' 103 Thus, the court's stan­
dard seemed to require a showing that a trade secret exists, a showing 
beyond just intimate knowledge of the trade secret by the employee, 
and finally some significance to an intent to use the secret. The Pep­
siCo court did not, however, clearly delineate its actions. Its final rea­
soning seemed to rest on a belief that Redmond or Quaker would act 
in bad faith and a "demonstrated inevitability" that Redmond would 
rely on the trade secrets in his new position.104 Therefore, it is possible 
the PepsiCo court had before it a case of threatened misappropriation, 
and at the least muddied the analysis by suggesting that the injunction 
was supported by an indication of bad faith. 
Id. 
found a trade secret to exist or not to exist . . .  perusal of the following list will show many in­
stances, particularly with reference to customer lists and business . . .  secrets, where different 
jurisdictions reach contrary conclusions concerning trade secret status with respect to essen­
tially identical matters. 
99. See PepsiCo, 54 F.3d at 1268. 
100. Id. at 1269. 
101. Id. at 1268 (quoting AMP, Inc. v. Fleischhacker, 823 F.2d 1 199, 1207 (7th Cir. 
1987)). 
102. See id. at 1269 ("This type of trade secret problem may arise less often, but it never­
theless falls within the realm of trade secret protection under the present circumstances."). 
Oddly, the PepsiCo court cited FMC Corp. v. Varco Int'!, Inc., 677 F.2d 500, 504 (5th Cir. 
1982), for the proposition that, "[e]ven assuming the best of good faith, [defendant] will have 
difficulty preventing his knowledge of . . .  manufacturing techniques from infiltrating his 
work." PepsiCo, 54 F.3d at 1270. This suggests that the court recognized that inevitable dis­
closure was not a "threatened disclosure" nor did it require bad faith. The court does not, 
however, rest on that analysis. 
103. PepsiCo, 54 F.3d at 1270. 
104. Id. at 1271 (upholding the injunction based on the "demonstrated inevitability that 
Redmond would rely on PCNA trade secrets in his new job at Quaker [and] the district 
court's reluctance to believe that Redmond would refrain from disclosing these secrets in his 
new position . . .  "). 
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2. Courts' Misapplication of PepsiCo 
Inevitable disclosure did not develop with a coherent definition 
consistent with a typical trade secrets determination because it devel­
oped outside of trade secrets law. The Seventh Circuit failed to supply 
such a definition. PepsiCo's legacy includes numerous bar journal arti­
cles and law review notes and articles attempting to describe the struc­
ture of the PepsiCo decision and its implications for trade secrets law 
in general and preventative client counseling in particular.105 While 
PepsiCo sparked a proliferation in the use of the inevitable disclosure 
doctrine,106 it did not provide a coherent standard for subsequent 
courts to follow. Other courts attempting to "follow" PepsiCo have di­
verged, without demonstrating a clear understanding of the rule they 
purport to follow. 
The first group of cases, in which courts say they have used Pep­
siCo to obtain equitable results even when inevitable disclosure may 
not have directly applied, cite PepsiCo as containing some factor not 
actually present in the PepsiCo opinion. They appear to be looking for 
some sort of authority on which to base their opinions. For example, 
in Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. v. Lockhart,107 a district court in Indiana 
first decided that the facts did not indicate any reason to believe the 
employee would reveal the secret.108 This finding should have been the 
end of the analysis because once the court finds that the employee will 
not reveal the secret in his daily duties or in bad faith, the court has no 
need for a remedy. Oddly, the Lockhart court did not end its analysis 
there but proceeded to distinguish PepsiCo.109 This court had no need 
for PepsiCo because it had already concluded that the defendant 
105. See, e.g., D. Peter Harvey, "Inevitable" Trade Secret Misappropriation After Pep­
siCo, Inc. v. Redmond, 537 PU/Pat 199 (1998); Koh, supra note 13; Scott D. Marrs, Trade 
Secrets - Preliminary Relief In Trade Secret Cases, 61 TEX. B.J. 880 (1998); Alan L. Sullivan, 
Is It Really 'Inevitable'? Dynamics of a Preliminary Injunction Proceeding in a Scientific 
Trade Secrets Case, SC7l ALI-ABA 159 (1998); Weinstein, supra note 13; Whaley, supra 
note 14; Johanna L. Edelstein, Note, Intellectual Slavery?: The Doctrine of Inevitable Disclo­
sure of Trade Secrets, 26 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 717 (1996). 
106. A search of Shepard's citations conducted in January 2002 reveals 79 cases citing 
the PepsiCo decision for the inevitable disclosure proposition. See also Maxxim Medical, Inc. 
v. Michelson, 51 F. Supp. 2d 773, 784 (S.D. Tex. 1999) ("California has adopted the Uniform 
Trade Secret Act ("UTSA"). Under the UTSA, a court may enjoin actual or threatened 
misappropriation . . . .  In the landmark case of PepsiCo, Inc. v. Redmond . . .  the court ap­
plied this provision of the UTSA to create what is now considered the 'inevitable disclosure' 
doctrine." (citations omitted)). 
107. 5 F. Supp. 2d 667 (S.D. Ind. 1998). 
108. See id. at 682. 
109. See id. ("Because misappropriation does not appear to be inevitable, or even seri­
ously threatened, this case is different from PepsiCo v. Redmond."). 
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would not disclose the secret.110 The only explanation offered in the 
court's opinion came in the form of references to inevitable disclosure 
as a subset of threatened misappropriation. The procedure outlined in 
this Note would have given the Lockhart court a standard analysis to 
follow. Rather than having to interpret the PepsiCo case and look for 
parallels, the court could have stopped at the point of determining that 
no disclosure of trade secret was threatened nor was the employee ca­
pable of inevitably disclosing it. 
Similarly, in Glaxo Inc. v. Novopharm Ltd.,111 the court first found 
that the plaintiff company made no efforts to protect secrets.112 The 
court then proceeded to cite PepsiCo and define inevitable disclo­
sure.113 Finally, the court renamed the doctrine the "inevitable discov­
ery/contempt theory"114 and rejected use of the doctrine because there 
was no on-going relationship between the defendant and plaintiff.115 
This has nothing to do with a trade secrets analysis. This court missed 
the important point that if there were no efforts made to protect se­
crets, then no trade secret existed. There was no need to reach the 
employee's knowledge because the company did not adequately make 
out its prima facie case. Far from looking for a standard analysis, 
Glaxo created its own and seemed to base it on a factor not even pres­
ent in the PepsiCo decision. 
The second group of cases interpret the PepsiCo definition of in­
evitable disclosure as a subset of threatened misappropriation.116 
Merck & Co. Inc. v. Lyon exemplifies this type of decision.117 That 
court, citing PepsiCo, determined that North Carolina recognized a 
number of factors to be considered: 
110. Possibly, this piece of dictum was meant to indicate that that court itself had con­
sidered whether disclosure might be "inevitable" and discarded the idea. Even if that is the 
case, it still demonstrates a lack of recognition or understanding of a coherent doctrine. 
111 .  931 F. Supp. 1280, 1302 (E.D.N.C. 1996). 
1 12. Recall, this means that there are no trade secrets that could have been misappro­
priated by the employee. See supra note 19. 
1 13. Glaxo, 931 F. Supp. at 1303. Oddly, the Glaxo court defined inevitable disclosure as 
being applicable only to "narrow technological fields" where an employee could not "forget" 
things learned on the job. While technological fields are quite susceptible to inevitable dis­
closure problems, Redmond's job in PepsiCo was not one in a "narrow technological field." 
Id. 
114. Id. 
115. Id.; see also Lumex, Inc. v. Highsmith, 919 F. Supp. 624 (E.D.N.Y. 1996) (claiming 
to have a case different from PepsiCo because both parties acted in reasonably good faith 
but deciding the case based on inevitable disclosure anyway). 
116. The reason inevitable disclosure becomes confusing for many courts is because the 
UTSA covers actual and threatened misappropriation. See Uniform Trade Secrets Act § 2, 
14 U.L.A. 437 (amended 1985) ("Actual or threatened misappropriation may be enjoined."). 
1 17. See Merck & Co. Inc. v. Lyon, 941 F. Supp. 1443, 1459-60 (M.D.N.C. 1996). 
1212 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 100:1184 
(1) The circumstances surrounding the termination of employment, (2) 
the importance of the employee's job or position, (3) the type of work 
performed by the employee, and ( 4) the kind of information sought to be 
protected and the value or need of the competitor for it. . . .  Thus . . .  
when the trade secret was clearly established and the possibility of dis­
closure high and the value to the competitor great, an injunction would 
issue even when there had been no bad faith or underhanded dealing by 
the former employee or the competitor.1 18 
The Merck court seemed surprised that an injunction could issue even 
without "bad faith or underhanded dealing." The court went on to 
analyze the application of the doctrine in other states. It found that 
other states considered the degree of competition between the old and 
new employer, the new employer's efforts to safeguard the former 
employer's trade secrets, and the former employee's lack of forth­
rightness.119 The court also noted that the employee's misrepresenta­
tions provided a basis for questioning his ability to comply with the 
confidentiality agreement - a clear case of threatened misappropria­
tion.120 The Merck opinion is highly dependent on drawing parallels to 
PepsiCo, but demonstrates that the issue before the court was threat­
ened misappropriation. It is quite likely the Merck facts presented a 
fine line between threatened misappropriation and inevitable disclo­
sure. Because the Merck court did not have a standard analysis to fol­
low, the court conflated the two. Also, rather than simply trying to 
draw parallels to PepsiCo without a coherent underlying structure on 
which to base those parallels, the Merck court could have benefited 
from looking at the solutions used by other courts following the same 
analysis. 
In another example, a district court in New York determined that 
the decision in PepsiCo was heavily influenced by the " 'lack of forth­
rightness' and 'out and out lies' by the former employee."121 This court 
distinguished its case from PepsiCo because there was no evidence of 
any attempt at deception. The court, therefore, decided that it was not 
following PepsiCo when it granted an injunction based on its determi­
nation that, " 'even assuming the best of good faith, it is doubtful 
whether the defendant could completely divorce his knowledge of the 
118. Id. 
119. Id. at 1460. 
120. Id. In Glaxo, the court cited PepsiCo and other cases and said of inevitable disclo­
sure, "the latter doctrine bars the employment of a competitor's former employee who had 
developed intimate expert knowledge of that competitor's confidential information in a nar­
row technological field, on the grounds that it would not be possible for that employee to 
'forget' or refrain from relying upon the confidential information," suggesting its own inter­
pretation of the standard set by PepsiCo. Glaxo, 931 F. Supp. at 1303. 
121. Lumex, Inc. v. Highsmith, 919 F. Supp. 624, 633 (E.D.N.Y. 1996). Arguably, these 
were factors in the PepsiCo decision, but the decision was not heavily influenced by them, 
nor did they even appear necessary to the decision. 
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trade secrets from any . . .  work he might engage in' with [the new em­
ployer] ."122 Ironically, the New York court's comments demonstrate 
that its holding was based on the real definition of inevitable disclo­
sure. Yet the court explained that by doing so it was deviating from 
PepsiCo. Again, the court's dependence on the PepsiCo facts pre­
vented a bigger-picture analysis as a standard part of the trade secrets 
inquiry. 
A Texas district court123 recently found that the factors used by the 
PepsiCo court included: the employee's possession of extensive trade 
secret knowledge above and beyond general skills; the responsibilities 
with the old and new employers were parallel; and deceit on the part 
of the defendant.124 This is an even more dangerous interpretation of 
PepsiCo. As demonstrated above, some courts mistakenly assume that 
PepsiCo provides a clear definition and then follow or deviate by 
drawing parallels. But this court gives the impression that a coherent 
doctrine of inevitable disclosure exists and is exemplified by PepsiCo 
and then, making matters worse, misinterprets PepsiCo.125 
In a final category of post-PepsiCo cases, some courts reject out­
right the PepsiCo analysis.126 For instance, the Northern District of 
Iowa, in 1997, completely redefined the doctrine for its own use.127 
122. Id. at 635 (citing Monovis, Inc. v. Aquino, 905 F. Supp. 1205, 1234 (W.D.N.Y. 
1994)). 
123. See Maxxim Med., Inc. v. Michelson, 51 F. Supp. 2d 773, 786 (S.D. Tex. 1999) ("Al­
though only a California Superior Court has had the opportunity to determine whether to 
follow Redmond, this Court believes that the California Supreme Court would follow the 
overwhelming majority of other jurisdictions to do so."), reversed, 182 F.3d 915 (5th Cir. 
1999). While the 5th Circuit reversed this case without opinion, it is very possible that the 
court recognized that the Maxxim court had placed too much faith in the steadfastness of the 
inevitable disclosure doctrine and its place in the law of trade secrets. Only after this opinion 
did California officially recognize and accept the inevitable disclosure doctrine at the appel­
late level (the Maxxim decision was decided based on California law). 
124. See Maxxim, 51 F. Supp. at 785-86. Oddly enough, the interpretations of the "bad 
blood" as a part of the PepsiCo decision seem to grow stronger as the years go on. The ac­
tual decision seems to mention the lack of forthrightness as an additional reason after de­
termining the inevitable disclosure while the Merck court emphasized it as a major factor 
and the Maxxim court calls it "deceit." Even those courts that try to base their decisions on 
PepsiCo do not interpret it uniformly. This court believed the Bridgestone/Firestone decision 
to be the only one which had not chosen to follow PepsiCo and concluded that Bridge­
stone/Firestone had done so only because of factual differences. See id. at 786. 
125. As another example, in Cardinal Freight Carriers, Inc. v. J.B. Hunt Transp. Servs., 
Inc., 987 S.W.2d 642, 644 (Ark. 1999), a state supreme court cited PepsiCo, among others, 
and then based its decision on factors clearly evidencing threatened misappropriation. 
126. Also in this third category of cases are those that simply ignore the existence of 
PepsiCo. DoubleClick, Inc. v. Henderson, No. 1 16914/97, 1997 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 577, *76 
(N.Y. Nov. 5, 1997), relied on Lumex, Inc. v. Highsmith, 919 F. Supp. 624 (E.D.N.Y. 1996) to 
say "this finding is bolstered by the fact that there is a high probability of 'inevitable disclo­
sure' of trade secrets in this case. Injunctive relief may issue where a former employee's new 
job function will inevitably lead her to rely on trade secrets belonging to a former em­
ployer." The court held that the former employee would likely disclose plaintiff's trade se­
crets "to aid his new employer and his own future . . . .  " This court had no real standard in 
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[Plaintiff] argued that [defendant] will 'inevitably' disclose trade secrets 
if he works for [new employer]. This Court has read that argument 
broadly in order to decide whether the analysis supports [plaintiff's] 
claim that [defendant] violated the noncompetition agreement because 
he is 'likely' to disclose proprietary information. This Court has therefore 
assumed for the purposes of this analysis that "likely to disclose" is the 
same as "inevitably will disclose."128 
That same court used PepsiCo to show that a court has discretion to 
decide whether the defendant's previous untrustworthiness could be 
the basis for an injunction.129 The Iowa court then held that the plain­
tiff had shown deceit but no inevitability and refused the injunction.U0 
It is difficult to determine exactly how this court interpreted the 
PepsiCo decision, but the Iowa court obviously rejected the inevitable 
disclosure analysis. 
As this Note has demonstrated, uniformity is crucial to trade se­
crets law and is one of the major objectives of the UTSA and the 
courts of the majority of states as a result. Trade secrets law is the 
most appropriate area of law in which to ground inevitable disclosure. 
As such, inevitable disclosure should be made a standard part of the 
analysis and should be defined uniformly by courts across the country. 
PepsiCo may have provided an example to follow, but these courts do 
not follow it consistently, nor do they even all interpret it in the same 
way. As a result, inevitable disclosure is in need of formal definition 
beyond simply citing PepsiCo as the example. This Note has at­
tempted to provide that definition and standard analysis. 
CONCLUSION 
This Note argues that courts should adopt a uniform definition of 
the inevitable disclosure doctrine that conforms to standard trade se­
cret analysis. Such a result would fill the gap that exists between 
threatened misappropriation and general employee knowledge. This 
result makes sense based on the development of the inevitable disclo­
sure doctrine. This solution provides greater protection for employers 
and employees by offering certainty at the outset of any employment 
relationship. Further, it grants courts discretion at the remedy phase to 
protect the rights of employees. 
mind and in fact appeared to decide the case based on a threatened misappropriation while 
using the phrase "inevitable disclosure" to adorn the opinion. 
127. See APAC Teleservices, Inc. v. McRae, 985 F. Supp. 852, 860-61 (N.D. Iowa. 1997). 
128. Id. at 860 n.6. 
129. See id. at 860-61. 
130. Id. at 861. 
